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COMMENTS
REEFER MADNESS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL





In the past twenty years, the United States has witnessed over half of its
states create marijuana laws that expressly contradict the federal government’s
complete ban of the drug. Nine states have completely legalized marijuana for
recreational use in the past five years alone. Meanwhile, much of the country
remains staunchly opposed to legalization in any form. This difference be-
tween state and federal law has the largest negative impact on noncitizens,
namely lawful permanent residents whom reside in states that follow the fed-
eral government’s complete ban. Congress’s Immigration and Nationality Act
broadly defines “conviction,” so even minor drug convictions under the Con-
trolled Substances Act—like simple possession of marijuana—render lawful
permanent residents deportable.
This problem is a constitutional violation because lawful permanent re-
sidents found possessing marijuana in a legal-regime state suffer no conse-
quences; whereas one found possessing marijuana in an illegal-regime state is
arrested and immediately taken to an immigration detention center to await
potential deportation. This disparate treatment results from a sole difference
between the two noncitizens: their geographic location. Thus, the federal gov-
ernment’s failure to uniformly enforce its marijuana laws constitutes a viola-
tion of lawful permanent residents’ Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection. Although Congress has traditionally been afforded great deference
when constructing the country’s immigration laws under the plenary power
doctrine, such a disparate result supports the argument that the government’s
failure to act has no rational basis in its own laws, which demands action.
This Comment argues that the federal government is depriving lawful per-
manent residents of their Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right to equal
protection by refusing to uniformly enforce its marijuana laws. Thus, lawful
permanent residents experience disparate treatment and face potential depor-
tation based solely on their geographic location.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Hector, a lawful permanent resident in the United States for the
previous fifteen years, is pulled over for a traffic violation.1 Hector
lives in California, a state—like seven others—in which state law devi-
ates from the federal ban on marijuana by legalizing it for both medi-
cal and recreational purposes.2 As the officer approaches the car, he
smells the faint odor of marijuana emanating from within. Having es-
tablished probable cause, the officer searches Hector’s car and ulti-
mately finds an ounce of marijuana in Hector’s trunk.3 But the officer
does not arrest or report Hector because marijuana possession is legal
under California state law.4 Thus, there is no obligation for local law
enforcement to report Hector to Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (“ICE”), so Hector can return home to his family, job, and life.5
1. This is a hypothetical scenario, illustrating how the current criminal justice sys-
tem unequally enforces federal law against lawful permanent residents who commit
the same act, based solely on their geographic location.
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007); Control, Regulate, and
Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act (“Adult Use of Marijuana Act”), CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11018 (West Supp. 2018).
3. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13; see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
696 (1996) (“[P]robable cause . . . exists[ ] where the known facts and circumstances
are sufficient to warrant a [person] of reasonable prudence in the belief that contra-
band or evidence of a crime will be found.”).
4. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11018, 11362.5.
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2012) (requiring that when an alien is arrested by a Fed-
eral, State, or local law enforcement official for violating any part of the CSA, and the
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The absence of a reporting obligation on behalf of California would
be consistent whether this was the first time California’s state police
found Hector to be in possession of marijuana, or the tenth time.6
Because California legalized marijuana, there is not a state offense
that Hector has committed that would warrant a report to ICE.7
That same day, Martin, Hector’s twin brother and also a lawful per-
manent resident in the United States for the previous fifteen years, is
pulled over for a similar traffic violation in Texas—where the state’s
law mirrors the federal government’s ban on marijuana.8 Again estab-
lishing probable cause due to the faint odor of marijuana, the police
search Martin’s car and find an ounce of marijuana in his trunk.9 Mar-
tin is subsequently charged for possession of marijuana—his second
such offense since arriving in the country—and arrested.10 Accord-
ingly, the state initiates deportation proceedings by reporting Martin
to ICE.11
Now, Martin is confined in jail, awaiting transportation to an ICE
detaining facility. Once there, he will discover that the living condi-
tions are not very different from the jail he just left.12 Officers will
take many of Martin’s personal belongings away, he will have to wear
a jumpsuit uniform and be guarded by uniformed officers, his privacy
will be limited by having to sleep in a large room with the other de-
tainees, and he will be unable to receive phone calls.13 While Martin
must stay in what is essentially a prison while awaiting his deportation
proceedings, his twin brother, Hector, is free to not only spend time
with his family but also to purchase and consume more marijuana
without fear of being potentially deported. This hypothetical illus-
arresting officer informs an INA agent of the alien’s legal status, the federal agent
must promptly determine whether to issue a detainer on the alien).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (requiring a conviction for violating a state
or federal law relating to controlled substances before deportation). Because Califor-
nia legalized marijuana possession of one ounce or less, Hector did not violate Cali-
fornia’s state law.
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d).
8. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.121 (West 2017).
9. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also Landa v. Obert, 45 Tex. 539 (1876) (defin-
ing probable cause as “a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the per-
son accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged”).
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). There is a Personal Use exception under the INA,
which prevents deportation for lawful permanent residents who have a single CSA
conviction. Id. But because this is Martin’s second such offense, and his initial posses-
sion offense resulted in a conviction, the personal use exception provides him no
relief.
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d).
12. Dagmar R. Myslinska, Living Conditions in Immigration Detention Centers,
NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/living-conditions-immigration-deten
tion-centers.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7NFZ-P5JK].
13. Id.
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trates how the federal government’s failure to uniformly enforce its
marijuana laws is creating an unfair class system, particularly for law-
ful permanent residents, by violating their Fourteenth Amendment
right of equal protection, based solely on their geographic location.
This Comment will discuss this issue in five parts: Part I provides a
brief history of this country’s regulation of the marijuana industry
over the past century and explains how recent developments concern-
ing both federal and state legislation have created confusion through-
out the country. Part II explains how the Immigration Nationality
Act—Congress’s vast and thorough compilation of immigration legis-
lation—interacts with the federal ban on marijuana by subjecting cer-
tain noncitizens to deportation proceedings for specific offenses. Part
III analyzes cases in which the American judicial system held the
Fourteenth Amendment to grant equal protection to lawful perma-
nent residents throughout various circumstances. Part IV illustrates
how the conflict between U.S. immigration and marijuana legislation
and the federal government’s failure to enforce its uniform marijuana
ban throughout the country have caused lawful permanent residents
to suffer disparate treatment, solely because of their geographic loca-
tion. Finally, Part V provides three solutions to this constitutional is-
sue which would potentially mitigate the unfair conditions facing
lawful permanent residents in certain areas of the country.
II. THE TUMULTUOUS REGULATION OF MARIJUANA
A. The Federal Government’s Constitutional
Prohibition on Marijuana
Although the possession, cultivation, and delivery of marijuana is
currently prohibited by federal law with the majority of state legisla-
tures following suit, marijuana was not always viewed in such a nega-
tive light. Before the twentieth century, a variety of industries utilized
marijuana to treat medical ailments14 and create products from mari-
juana’s hemp.15 However, this came to a halt when Congress passed
its first anti-marijuana prohibition bill in 1937.16 Many scholars be-
lieve that racial discrimination motivated this legislation, but it was
ultimately repealed in 1969 to make way for the current federal mari-
juana statute—the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).17 The CSA
14. RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, THE MARIHUANA CON-
VICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1974)
(describing hemp as a popular medical treatment in the mid-nineteenth century and
noting that its primary use was for legitimate medical purposes).
15. Id. at 1 (providing the three main purposes of hemp: the fiber is used for mak-
ing cloth, twine, and rope; the resin is used as a psychoactive agent, medicinal, relig-
ious, and intoxicating purposes; and the seeds are used for drying bird food and oil).
16. Marijuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1969).
17. See, e.g., Sam Kamin, The Challenges of Marijuana Law Reform, in ASPATORE
SPECIAL REPORT, THE IMPACT OF THE DECRIMINALIZATION AND LEGALIZATION OF
MARIJUANA 5, 22 (Melanie Zimmerman ed., 2010); see generally BONNIE & WHITE-
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regulates the manufacture, possession, and distribution of drugs, in-
cluding marijuana.18
Under the CSA, Congress places drugs into one of five schedules
(I–V), depending on their potential for abuse, risk to the public
health, and medical value.19 Accordingly, Congress placed marijuana
on Schedule I, thus imposing the strictest restrictions possible on it.20
By determining that marijuana possessed no accepted medical use and
a high potential for abuse, Congress thereby prohibited the manufac-
ture, distribution, and possession of the drug.21
Although repeated attempts have been made to reschedule mari-
juana in the last forty-eight years, the federal government has repeat-
edly denied such efforts, even as recently as in 2016.22 With the recent
medical-marijuana-legalization movement rushing through the states
in the past decade, proponents of legalization question why the fed-
eral government remains adamant about criminalizing a drug most
Americans believe is beneficial to those with serious medical condi-
tions.23 But the government’s rigid stance stems from various beliefs:
that its medical benefits are at best unproven by accurate science, that
it harms users and those around them, and that it would eventually be
diverted into the black market.24
BREAD, supra note 14, at 32–33 (explaining the history of marijuana criminalization,
including its association with racial minorities and poor people).
18. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91–513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971).
19. 21 U.S.C. §§ 811–812 (2012).
20. 21 U.S.C § 812(b)(1). At the most restrictive scheduling possible, marijuana
shares this classification with drugs like heroin, LSD, and ecstasy. Id. Comparing ma-
rijuana’s scheduling to other drugs with less stringent regulations—like cocaine,
methamphetamine, and OxyContin—shows Congress’s remarkable impression on
marijuana.
21. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012).
22. See All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Agency, 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (denying rescheduling petition and discussing the history of such efforts);
Carrie Johnson, DEA Rejects Attempt To Loosen Federal Restrictions On Marijuana,
NPR (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/10/489509471/dea-rejects-attempt-
to-loosen-federal-restrictions-on-marijuana [https://perma.cc/LNE5-5AZJ] (Drug En-
forcement Administration chief Rosenberg said this “decision is rooted in science,”
and he gave “enormous weight” to the FDA’s conclusions that marijuana has “no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States”).
23. Medical Marijuana in the U.S. – Statistics & Facts, STATISTICA, https://
www.statista.com/topics/3064/medical-marijuana-in-the-us/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/GZV3-22HU] (“According to surveys from recent years, public ap-
proval of medical marijuana has indeed increased, remaining above 77 percent since
2011.”).
24. Medical Marijuana Referenda in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Gen. Barry
McCaffrey, Dir., Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy), (elaborating on the rationales
behind the federal government’s categorical ban); Memorandum from Jefferson B.
Session, III, Attorney Gen., to all United States Attorneys (Jan. 4 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download [https://perma.cc/M8VU-
5PDU ] [hereinafter Sessions Memo] (rescinding the Obama Administration’s lenient
approach to marijuana enforcement because of “Congress’s determination that mari-
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The United States Supreme Court upheld the CSA as constitutional
in Gonzalez v. Raich.25 There, federal Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (“DEA”) agents seized and destroyed all the respondent’s mari-
juana plants.26 But the respondent’s use and cultivation of marijuana
for medical purposes was considered legal under California’s Compas-
sionate Use Act.27 Additionally, Raich used all his plants for personal
use, never attempting to sell or bring them across state lines.28
Regardless, the Court upheld the CSA’s legitimacy under Con-
gress’s authority derived from the Commerce Clause.29 Although the
Court defined Raich’s marijuana-related activities as purely local, it
categorized them as part of “an economic ‘class of activities’ that have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”30 Accordingly, the Court
ruled that Congress had a rational basis for implementing the CSA
because the failure to regulate marijuana would “undercut the regula-
tion of the interstate market in that commodity.”31 Legal scholars as-
sumed this ruling would end state efforts to contravene the federal
ban, but the majority of states have continued to defy the CSA, as the
following Section explains.
B. Recent State Efforts to Legalize Marijuana
Although the federal government refuses to budge on its strict cate-
gorization of marijuana, the twenty-first century has seen a plethora of
states contravene the CSA. As of this writing, twenty-nine U.S. states,
the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico have done so by
either decriminalizing the drug, legalizing it for medical purposes, or
outright legalizing recreational marijuana and regulating it like alco-
hol and tobacco.32
The legalization movement began in 1996 when California passed
Proposition 215, thus becoming the first state in the country to legally
allow access to medical marijuana.33 In the following twenty-one
juana is a dangerous drug and that marijuana activity is a serious crime.”); Robert A.
Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked
Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1435 (2009).
25. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id. at 6–7.
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 26 (holding that because the CSA is a statute that directly regulates
economic, commercial activity, there is no doubt regarding its constitutionality).
30. Id. at 16.
31. Id. at 18.
32. State Marijuana Laws in 2018 Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/
gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html [https://perma.cc/J6V2-
HBRQ] (showing Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ne-
vada, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia have adopted “the
most expansive laws legalizing marijuana for recreational use.”).
33. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 8,
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [https://
perma.cc/MWS7-6WWS] (protecting citizens from criminal penalties; providing ac-
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years, twenty-eight states followed suit with respect to medical pur-
poses.34 These states generally have some type of patient registry,
which provides protection against arrest for users possessing the drug
for personal-medicinal use.35 The road to regulation has not been easy
though; every state has had to answer complicated policy questions,
such as “how to regulate its recommendation, dispensing, and registra-
tion of approved patients.”36
What may surprise some scholars is the fact that this movement is
not confined to liberal or coastline states. Recently, southern and tra-
ditionally conservative states like Arkansas, Texas, Nevada, and Ala-
bama have adopted their own legislation permitting medical
marijuana.37 Although these bills are narrowly drafted—they only al-
low access to “Low-THC Cannabis” for certain, qualified seizure pa-
tients—they still inspire proponents of legalization.38 Now, not only
do the majority of the States recognize marijuana’s beneficial medical
effects, but their legislative efforts further undermine the federal gov-
ernment’s classification of the drug under Schedule I.39
While states began legalizing medical marijuana in 1996, it took an-
other sixteen years before two states finally took the next step: legaliz-
ing recreational marijuana. In separate 2012 referendums, the
majority of both Colorado and Washington’s citizens voted to legalize
marijuana for recreational use.40 As some celebrated, many worried
that the federal government would interfere with the states’ marijuana
regimes by enforcing the CSA.41
C. The Executive Branch’s Response to States’
Legalized-Marijuana Regimes
Given the federal government’s attempted interference with Cali-
fornia’s medical-marijuana laws,42 many expected similar, if not more
aggressive attempts to thwart emerging recreational regimes.43 But in
cess through home cultivation and dispensaries; allowing a variety of strains; and al-






39. Johnson, supra note 22.
40. Christina Ng, A.B. Phillips, & Clayton Sandell, Colorado, Washington Become




42. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the federal government’s au-
thority under the CSA to prosecute those in possession of marijuana, regardless of the
state’s laws; but not invalidating California’s medical marijuana law).
43. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Federal Supremacy When States Relax
(or Abandon) Marijuana Bans, CATO INST. 8 (Dec. 12, 2012), https://object.cato.org/
sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA714.pdf. [https://perma.cc/WQ5F-L7WR].
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2013, the Obama Administration’s Department of Justice surprised
the nation when it released the Cole Memo.44 This memo acknowl-
edged the recent trend of legalization—both medicinal and recrea-
tional—and set forth eight distinct “enforcement priorities” that the
federal government would pursue.45 Additionally, the Justice Depart-
ment, recognizing its limited resources and manpower, had advised
the states with some form of a legal-marijuana regime to develop and
implement “strong and effective regulatory and enforcement
systems.”46
While the Cole Memo did not alter the Department’s authority to
enforce federal law under the CSA, it assured states like California
and Washington that if they did not violate any of the eight “enforce-
ment priorities” and they established a “legitimate” regulatory
scheme, they should not expect the federal government to intrude
upon their operations.47 In the four years since the Cole Memo’s issu-
ance, the executive branch had been true to its word and refrained
from enforcing the democratically passed CSA.48
However, every new administration has the potential to drastically
change previous policies. When Donald Trump became president in
2016, many feared for legal marijuana’s uncertain future under a re-
publican administration.49 These fears were exacerbated when Presi-
dent Trump appointed Jeff Sessions as the new United States
Attorney General.50 Sessions is known to have “a long and antagonis-
tic attitude toward marijuana.”51 While Sessions’s combative views are
44. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to all United
States Attorneys (Aug. 3, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9N9-JRKA] [hereinafter Cole
Memo].
45. Id.; (“1. Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; 2. Preventing reve-
nue from marijuana sales from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; 3.
Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in
some form to other states; 4. Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from be-
ing used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal
activity; 5. Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribu-
tion of marijuana; 6. Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other ad-
verse public health consequences associated with marijuana use; 7. Preventing the
growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public safety and environ-
mental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and 8. Preventing
marijuana possession or use on federal property.”).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Dave Kopilak, The Donald Trump Risk Factor and a Showdown for the Cole
Memo, EMERGE L. GROUP (Dec. 8, 2016), http://emergelawgroup.com/the-donald-
trump-risk-factor-and-a-showdown-for-the-cole-memo/ [https://perma.cc/Y8AD-
B6CZ].




51. Id. As a federal attorney in Alabama in the 1980s, Sessions said he thought the
KKK “[was] OK until [he] found out [its members] smoked pot.” In April of 2016, he
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at least publicly known, the world has yet to hear President Trump’s
official opinion.52 In February 2015, then-presidential candidate
Trump “expressed support for medical marijuana, but [he] drew the
line at recreational adult use” at an annual Conservative Political Ac-
tion Conference.53 But proponents of legalization found solace in
Trump’s response when pressed on the states’ rights aspect: “If they
vote for it, they vote for it.”54
Since the 2016 election, the Trump Administration focused on the
opioid crisis in the U.S. As recently as October 26, 2017, Sessions
echoed the popular 1980s-era argument that marijuana is a “gateway”
to harder drugs, like heroin.55 President Trump echoed this sentiment,
adding that “there is nothing desirable about drugs. They’re bad.”56
But research has cast doubt on the effectiveness of the gateway theory
and the “Just Say No” campaign that First Lady Nancy Reagan started
in the 1980s.57
Fearing a harsher policy from the new Trump Administration, four
state governors sent a letter to Sessions urging him to continue the
federal government’s non-enforcement policy under the Cole
Memo.58 The Attorney General replied with a letter of his own, laying
said, “Good people don’t smoke marijuana,” and that it was a “very real danger” that
is “not the kind of thing that ought to be legalized.” Id. Sessions delivered a speech to
a sheriff’s gathering where he said, “I cannot and will not pretend that a duly enacted
law of this country—like the federal ban on marijuana—does not exist. Marijuana is
illegal in the United States—even in Colorado, California, and everywhere else in
America.” Thomas Angell, Jeff Sessions Slams GOP Senator Over Marijuana, FORBES
(Feb. 12, 2018, 10:47 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/02/12/jeff-ses
sions-slams-gop-senator-over-marijuana/#56b50bee7995 [https://perma.cc/J7EG-
8GZ9]. Sessions is quoted as saying “I reject the idea that America will be a better
place if marijuana is sold in every corner store. And I am astonished to hear people
suggest that we can solve our heroin crisis by legalizing marijuana—so people can
trade one life-wrecking dependency for another that’s only slightly less awful.” Tom
Embury-Dennis, Jeff Sessions Describes Marijuana as ‘Only Slightly Less Awful’ Than
Heroin, INDEP. (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/
us-politics/jeff-sessions-marijuana-cannabis-heroin-donald-trump-weed-a7634031.htm
[https://perma.cc/VN26-YF54].
52. Higdon, supra note 49.
53. Id. (“I say it’s bad,” then-presidential-candidate Trump answered when ques-
tioned over Colorado’s recreational marijuana law.).
54. Id. (providing an inference that President Trump will not interfere with states
who democratically choose to legalize marijuana).
55. Christopher Ingraham, Trump Speaks Out on Drugs: ‘They’re Bad’, WASH.




57. Id.; Marijuana?, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE 20–21 (2018), https://
d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/1380-marijuana.pdf (last updated
June 2018) [https://perma.cc/DWV3-52VU] (“[F]urther research is needed to explore
this question,” but the overwhelming majority of people who try marijuana do not go
on to use other drugs).
58. Letter from Bill Walker et al., Governor of Alaska, to Jeff Sessions, Attorney
Gen. (Apr. 3, 2017), http://files.constantcontact.com/201bc6cf001/8bd444e9-e3c1-4fa5-
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out his concerns that legalized states have failed to follow the Cole
Memo’s priorities.59 Sessions ended his letter by inquiring how these
states planned to address these findings.60
On January 4, 2018, the Trump Administration finally answered
these concerns when Sessions issued his own memo, which effectively
and immediately rescinded the Cole Memo.61 Describing the Obama
Administration’s previous memo as “unnecessary,” Sessions’s memo
makes multiple mentions of Congress’s CSA and money-laundering
statutes to bolster his Justice Department’s position that “marijuana is
a dangerous drug and that marijuana activity is a serious crime.”62
Legislators representing states with legal-marijuana regimes have pub-
licly bombarded Sessions’s memo, with one Colorado Senator even
threatening to hold U.S. Department of Justice nominees.63
Therefore, legalized marijuana’s future in the U.S. remains clouded
in doubts and fear of federal intervention. This causes problems not
just for lawful permanent residents like Martin—who suffers from
nothing more than happening to live in a state that continues to pro-
hibit marijuana—but also for all Americans who expect the federal
government to uniformly treat its citizens in a fair and just manner.
a63d-9e9197350a87.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MZ2-GTLP]. The governors were the gov-
ernors of Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington. Id.
59. Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions, Attorney Gen., to Jay Inslee et al., Gover-
nor of Washington (July 24, 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/big.assets.huffington
post.com/LtrfromSessions.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Y3L-RGZ3]. Sessions cited findings
from a 2016 report by the Northwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. Id. This
report found the black market growing due to lack of regulation, oversight, and trans-
parency; interstate transportation of Washington’s marijuana; underage consumption,
driving while impaired; and a 54% increase in marijuana-related calls to State Poison
Control Center between 2012 and 2014. Id. See generally Washington State Marijuana
Impact Report, N.W. HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, http://mfiles.org/
docs/marijuanaimpact2016.pdf (last updated Jan. 2019) [https://perma.cc/928A-SZK9].
60. Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions to Jay Inslee, supra note 59.
61. Sessions Memo, supra note 24.
62. Id. In the statement announcing his memorandum, Sessions said, “It is the
mission of the Department of Justice to enforce the laws of the United States, and the
previous issuance of guidance undermines the rule of law.” Press Release, Jeff Ses-
sions, Attorney General, Justice Department Issues Memo on Marijuana Enforce-
ment (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-memo-
marijuana-enforcement [https://perma.cc/6HHT-8VWR].
63. Jesse Paul & Jon Murray, Cory Gardner Says AG Jeff Sessions’ Decision to
Rescind Marijuana Policy “Has Trampled on the Will” of Colorado Voters, DENVER
POST (Jan. 4, 2018, 12:34 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/01/04/cory-gardner-
jeff-sessions-marijuana-policy/ [https://perma.cc/H9YM-WVTL]. U.S. Senator Cory
Gardner of Colorado states that Sessions’s memo “has trampled on the will of the
voters” and accuses Sessions of lying to him during Sessions’s confirmation hearing
where Sessions “assured [Senator Garner] that marijuana would not be a priority for
this administration.” Senator Gardner maintains that the Administration’s action “di-
rectly contradicts what [he] was told, and [that he is] prepared to take all steps neces-
sary, including holding [U.S. Department of Justice] nominees, until the attorney
general lives up to the commitment he made to [the senator] prior to his confirma-
tion.” Id.
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III. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAWS AND HOW THEY ARE
RELATED TO MARIJUANA OFFENSES
This Part discusses how this country’s immigration laws have devel-
oped in recent decades. Specifically, it discusses how the immigration
agencies have incorporated Congress’s CSA provisions with their own
grounds for deportation. Additionally, this Part analyzes the trajec-
tory of ICE’s purpose and how its laws have impacted deportees.
A. Overview of the Immigration Process and
Criminal Convictions Generally
Although once touted as a “country of immigrants,”64 the United
States has since developed an intricate and elaborate immigration
scheme that makes legal immigration a complex process.65 The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly stated that the federal government pos-
sesses plenary authority over immigration, thus clearing the way for
Congress to establish the nation’s immigration laws.66 Congress’s
modern immigration legislation began in 1952 with the passage of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).67
The INA was originally enforced by the U.S. Customs Service and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, but the two agencies
merged in 2003 to create the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) and its subagency, ICE.68 Because of ICE’s unique combina-
tion of legal authorities, its investigators are touted as being more effi-
64. Brian Donnelly, Foreign Affairs, Drug Interdiction, and Immigration, 21 SUF-
FOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 269, 274 (1998) (discussing how the United States is a
“country of immigrants” by “constantly infusing into our gene pool peoples from all
around the world,” thus establishing the U.S.’s great growth and vitality).
65. DeLeith Duke Gossett, “(Take from Us Our) Wretched Refuse”: The Deporta-
tion of America’s Adoptees, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 33, 36 (2017) (discussing recent legisla-
tion shifting the U.S. immigration experience from inclusion to exclusion and how
many citizens believe this new regime is too restrictive and not cognizant of the U.S.’s
origin).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395–96
(2012) (explaining such authority is derived from the government’s constitutional
power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization” and its inherent power as
sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that the intent to displace state law
altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”).
67. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 201(a), 205, 66
Stat. 163, 175 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012)) (eliminating racial limi-
tations on immigration).
68. Who We Are, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/
about (last updated Dec. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/R5NC-4HUY]; U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, ICE INVESTIGATIONS: MISSION ROLES IN MULTI-AGENCY
AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2007), https://www.fbiic.gov/public/2008/may/ice_mis
sion_roles.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5TK-N8LY] [hereinafter ICE INVESTIGATIONS] (the
Patriot Act’s passing created the Department of Homeland Security, which merged
the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service into ICE).
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cient and thorough than any previous enforcement agency.69 ICE
currently employs more than 20,000 employees in over 400 offices
nationwide.70
Under the INA’s current structure, the list of deportable offenses is
exhaustive and ranges anywhere from marriage fraud to firearm of-
fenses.71 Regarding controlled substances, the INA’s deportability
grounds require a conviction before proceedings may begin.72 This
conviction must result from a violation of any state or federal law re-
lating to a controlled substance.73 The statute refers to Section 802 of
Title 21—the CSA—that includes marijuana as a controlled sub-
stance.74 But the INA provides a personal-use exception for lawful
permanent residents only.75 If they plead guilty to possession of mari-
juana, they may avoid deportation if their guilty plea is “a single of-
fense involving possession for one’s own use of thirty grams or less of
marijuana.76 Put simply, a lawful permanent resident who has been
convicted for possessing less than an ounce of marijuana is not subject
to deportation under the personal-use exception if it is his or her first
and only conviction.
But this exception would not afford a remedy for Martin because,
as mentioned above, he has already been convicted once for mari-
juana possession prior to this new offense. Thus, Martin remains in an
ICE detention facility, unable to control his future; whereas Hector
has the freedom to visit his family throughout the country and partici-
pate in society.
B. ICE’s Purpose
Currently, ICE enforces federal laws concerning immigration and
border control.77 Its purpose is to promote public safety and home-
land security.78 In its latest strategic plan for fiscal years 2016–2020,
ICE’s key goals are countering terrorism, protecting the borders, and
69. ICE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 68 (ICE investigations derive authority
under Title 19 and 8, permitting them to pursue a variety of cases, conduct searches
and make arrests without obtaining a warrant, and seize criminal assets).
70. Who We Are, supra note 68.
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012).
72. Id.
73. Id.; Immigration Consequences of Drug Offenses: Handout, NAT’L ASS’N OF
CRIM. DEF. LAW., https://www.nacdl.org/uploadedFiles/Content/Legal_Education/
Live_CLE/Live_CLE/03_Drug_Offenses_Handout.pdf. (last visited Jan. 4, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/8GQ2-8CTL].
74. 8 U.S.C § 1227. This means that, even if convicted of a state drug violation,
someone is only subject to deportation if he or she is convicted for association with a
drug that the CSA criminalizes.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Who We Are, supra note 68.
78. Id.
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operating an efficient, effective agency.79 Concerning ICE’s role with
illicit drugs, its overall mandate is to “detect, disrupt, and dismantle
smuggling operations.”80
However, immigration-enforcement obligations do not solely con-
sist of “initiating prompt proceedings that lead to removal at any
cost.”81 Rather, the Government concerns itself more with ensuring
justice is done.82 The Third and Fifth Circuits have reiterated this re-
sponsibility specifically for ICE attorneys.83
Within six years, ICE has experienced a drastic shift in its enforce-
ment priorities. In 2011, then-DHS Director John Morton issued a
guidance to ICE attorneys regarding their prosecutorial discretion.84
Recognizing the agency’s limited resources, this 2011 memo empha-
sized the agency’s highest priority as removing “aliens who pose a
danger to national security or a risk to public safety.”85
But once President Trump took office, John Kelly—then-DHS Sec-
retary—quickly released the administration’s new guidelines.86 Kelly’s
memo directed ICE to hire an additional 10,000 officers and agents,
thus increasing its resources to execute the INA against all removable
aliens.87 Further, the memo explicitly prioritizes the removal of those
79. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS EN-
FORCEMENT: STRATEGIC PLAN 2016–2020 2 (Sept. 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/de
fault/files/publications/Office%20of%20Immigration%20Statistics%20Strategic%20
Plan%20FY%202016-2020%20%28Final%29_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/T79H-X5UF].
80. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, REVIEW OF U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUS-
TOMS ENFORCEMENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2017 DRUG CONTROL PERFORMANCE SUM-
MARY REPORT 1 (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/
2018-02/OIG-18-45-Jan18.pdf [https://perma.cc/GBX7-9MQQ].
81. S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 727 (B.I.A. 1997).
82. Id.
83. Kang v. Attorney Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Handford v.
United States, 249 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1958)) (An ICE attorney is “the representa-
tive of a government dedicated to fairness and equal justice to all and, in this respect,
he owes a heavy obligation to [his adversary].”).
84. Memorandum from John Morton, Director U.S. Immigration & Customs En-
forcement, to All ICE Employees (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/re-
leases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf [https://perma.cc/K65N-7HHS]; Enforcement
and Litigation, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/en-
forcement-and-litigation (last updated June 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/D3V8-6CN6]
(ICE attorneys “advance ICE’s homeland security mission by enforcing the nation’s
immigration, customs and criminal laws and policies, defending the operational au-
thorities and decisions of ICE agents and officers in federal court, and guiding and
supporting the advocacy of ICE attorneys before the immigration courts and the
Board of Immigration Appeals.”).
85. Memorandum from Morton to All ICE Employees, supra note 84 (including
extremely serious crimes like terrorism, espionage, violent crimes, and organized
criminal gangs and reiterating the two-felony conviction requirement, commonly re-
ferred to as the personal-use exception for marijuana).
86. Memorandum from John Kelly, Secretary Dep’t of Homeland Security, to Ke-
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aliens described by Congress in Section 237(a)(2) of the INA, which
codifies the CSA’s deportability grounds.88 Another major policy shift
involved ICE taking a step back from its previous focus on aliens who
committed violent crimes.89 Now, the focus is on removable aliens
who “have been convicted of any criminal offense,” as well as those
who have only committed acts that constitute chargeable-criminal of-
fenses but have yet to be charged or convicted.90
Pertinent to this Comment, the recent ICE guidance explicitly pro-
hibits prosecutorial discretion in a manner “that exempts or excludes
a specified class or category of aliens” from enforcement of the INA.91
Yet this has been, and currently is, the result of the INA’s enforce-
ment since states began legalizing marijuana.92 Then-Secretary Kelly’s
guidance expressly conflicted with the Cole Memo, which effectively
established two specified classes of aliens—those who live in legal-
marijuana states, and those who do not.93 Although Attorney General
Sessions’s recent memo attempts to resolve the conflict between en-
forcement agencies by announcing the common goal to enforce the
law, the memo still provides little actual guidance.94
Thus, immigration laws are not being consistently enforced because
of the differences among state and federal law concerning marijuana.
This governmental failure causes noncitizens like Martin to suffer the
most, solely because of where they choose to reside in the U.S.
C. Drugs and Cases
Early decisions involving INA and CSA enforcement provisions
were not favorable to lawful permanent residents.95 Although the
Obama Administration prioritized violent felonies, Congress drafted
the INA such that it defined an “aggravated felony” to include as “il-
88. Id.
89. Id.; Memorandum from Morton to All ICE Employees, supra note 84.
90. Memorandum from Kelly to McAleenan, supra note 86. (Although this gui-
dance does not specifically mention marijuana, it encourages ICE agents to pursue
convictions of “any criminal offense,” which includes simple marijuana possession
under 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)).
91. Id.
92. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 566 (2010) (providing an example
of ICE attempting to deport a lawful permanent resident for an aggravated felony
conviction under Texas’s similar ban marijuana where, had the immigrant been found
in possession of marijuana in a legalized state, he would not have faced any ICE
consequences).
93. Cole Memo, supra note 44.
94. Sessions Memo, supra note 24.
95. Fernandez v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that a lawful
permanent resident’s second state-law conviction for simple controlled substance pos-
session requires mandatory removal), vacated sub nom. Fernandez v. Holder, 561 U.S.
1001 (2010), and abrogated by Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010); see
also Julce v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that a lawful permanent
resident of ten years is subject to mandatory removal because of his state-law mari-
juana convictions), abrogated by Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013).
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licit trafficking in a controlled substance.”96 “Illicit trafficking in a
controlled substance” applies to convictions for offenses that the CSA
punishes as felonies, i.e., offenses that are punishable by more than
one year’s imprisonment.97 Hence, a possession-of-marijuana convic-
tion could still warrant an alien’s removal under the prior administra-
tion’s more lenient approach.98 Additionally, lawful permanent
residents convicted of an aggravated felony are not only deportable,
but they are also ineligible for discretionary relief.99
But in recent years the Supreme Court has begun analyzing aggra-
vated felonies derived from CSA convictions with more scrutiny. In
2010, the Court held that “second or subsequent simple possession
offenses are not aggravated felonies . . . when . . . the state conviction
is not based on the fact of a prior conviction.”100 In Carachuri-
Rosendo, a lawful permanent resident faced deportation after commit-
ting two misdemeanor drug-possession offenses in Texas.101 The Gov-
ernment argued that deportation was mandatory because his charges
amounted to an aggravated felony.102
But the Court disagreed. Analyzing the statute’s “ordinary mean-
ing,” the Court explained that a statutory scheme applying an “aggra-
vated” label to “any simple possession offense is, to say the least,
counterintuitive and unorthodox.”103 Because the Government ad-
vanced its argument for a result contradictory to what the English lan-
guage tells society to expect, the Court expressly warned that it must
be “very wary of the Government’s position.”104 Additionally, an am-
biguity arose when determining whether the misdemeanor-possession
offense was punishable by up to a year—as required by the INA—or
whether the existence of recidivism would allow it to be punishable by
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012).
97. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(2), 3559(a)(5) (2012).
98. The INA defines a “felony” as an offense with a maximum term of imprison-
ment that is greater than one year. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(5). If the state’s marijuana
offense constitutes a “felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act,” then
it qualifies as an aggravated felony. Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006). Thus, it
is possible for an alien to be subject to mandatory removal, based solely on marijuana
drug offenses, if the state’s criminal offense mirrors the CSA.
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). Generally, when lawful permanent re-
sidents are convicted of CSA drug charges, they are eligible for discretionary forms of
relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3),
1229b(b)(1)(C) (2012) providing that one can seek asylum or withholding and defer-
ral of removal under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No.
100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a) (2018)). But noncitizens convicted of
aggravated felonies are ineligible for withholding of removal.
100. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 566.
101. Id. at 563.
102. Id. at 572.
103. Id. at 574. The Court goes on to explain that a felony is “a serious crime
usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death.” See also
Felony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
104. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 575.
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up to two years, causing it to be treated as an aggravated felony.105
This ambiguity in the criminal statutes referencing immigration laws
required the Court to construe them in the noncitizen’s favor.106 Thus,
the Court held that lawful permanent residents who commit second or
subsequent simple possession offenses cannot be found to have com-
mitted aggravated felonies if the offenses were wholly separate.107
In 2013, the Supreme Court held that state statutes criminalizing the
social sharing of a small amount of marijuana are not aggravated felo-
nies under the INA.108 During a traffic stop in Georgia, police found
1.3 grams of marijuana in a lawful permanent resident’s car.109 After
his subsequent guilty plea to possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute, the Federal Government sought his removal.110 The Gov-
ernment reasoned that because Georgia’s criminal statute is an of-
fense under the CSA “punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment,”
it constituted an aggravated felony.111
But the Court disagreed. Employing the “categorical approach,”
the Court analyzed whether the state offense was comparable to any
of the INA’s offenses.112 The categorical approach ignores the facts of
the particular case and instead focuses on whether the “state statute
defining the crime of conviction” categorically fits within the “ge-
neric” federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony.113 This
means the offenses must be viewed in the abstract to determine
whether they have similar natures of comparison.114 Accordingly, a
state offense categorically matches with a generic federal offense only
if the state offense conviction “‘necessarily’ involved . . . facts equat-
ing to [the] generic [federal offense].”115 Because this approach is not
fact-sensitive, the analysis focuses on the lowest-possible criminalized
act from the statute.116
The Court concluded that although Georgia’s criminal statute clas-
sified the crime as a felony, there was an exception that lowered it to a
misdemeanor if it only “involve[d] a small amount of marijuana for no
105. Id. at 576.
106. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004).
107. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 566.
108. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 187 (2013).
109. Id. at 188.
110. Id. at 188–89.
111. Id. at 189.
112. Id. at 190. When the Government alleges that a state conviction qualifies as an
“aggravated felony” under the INA, the Court generally employs a “categorical ap-
proach” to determine whether the state offense is comparable to an offense listed in
the INA. See, e.g., Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 33–38, (2009).
113. Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
599–600 (1990)).
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24 (2005) (plurality
opinion)).
116. Id. at 190–91.
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remuneration.”117 Thus, the lawful permanent resident’s conviction
did not “necessarily” contain facts that corresponded to “an offense
punishable as a felony under the CSA.”118 Accordingly, the lawful
permanent resident did not commit an aggravated felony, and his re-
moval was no longer mandatory.119
While recent Supreme Court decisions may reassure Martin that his
subsequent possession-of-marijuana charge will not be classified as an
aggravated felony,120 this by no means forecloses the possibility that
Martin could get deported.121 But it does provide him an opportunity
to contest the proceedings—something he would be unable to do had
the Court ruled otherwise in Moncrieffe.122
Therefore, Martin remains in ICE custody for a simple drug of-
fense, like “one out of every four ‘criminal removals,’” which
amounted to more than 250,000 deportations from 1997 to 2012
alone.123 During his indefinite detention, Martin will experience
“often horrible conditions of confinement.”124 Ultimately, it is often
hard to distinguish detention facilities from actual prisons, which
makes the fact that Martin and the hundreds of thousands of legal
permanent residents like him must suffer such humiliating conditions
even more unjust.125
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION AND IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES
The Fourteenth Amendment prevents a single sovereign from treat-
ing a citizen or class of citizens differently than others under similar
117. Id. at 193–94.
118. Id. at 194–95.
119. Id. at 204.
120. Ming Wei Chen v. Sessions, 864 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that a nonci-
tizen’s prior Illinois conviction for possessing more than 30 but not more than 500
grams of marijuana did not qualify as an aggravated felony).
121. Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 204.
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2012) (The Attorney General does not have discretion
to cancel removal proceedings for noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies).
123. Deportation and Drug Convictions, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, https://www.
immigrantdefenseproject.org/deportation-and-drug-convictions/ (last visited Jan. 4,
2019) [https://perma.cc/WLS7-ATLG].
124. Sunita Patel & Tom Jawetz, Conditions of Confinement in Immigration Deten-
tion Facilities, AM. C.L. UNION 1, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_docu
ment/unsr_briefing_materials.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5ULR-
R5W3] (providing examples of horrible conditions that include “grossly inadequate
health care, physical and sexual abuse, overcrowding, discrimination, and racism.”).
125. See id. (Both facilities share “lack of access to necessary medications[;] . . .
shackling; use of segregation or tasers for disciplinary purposes; [and] inability to visit
with family members. . . .”); see also Ed Pilkington, Torn Apart: The American Fami-
lies Hit by Trump’s Immigration Crackdown, GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/21/immigration-families-deportation-
crackdown-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/SBH6-G8D4] (describing one daughter’s
experience visiting her father in an immigration detention center in California. It was
“like a prison,’” she recalled, and it surprised her “that as soon as [she went] in to hug
him, and sit down, they [said] you cannot touch him.”).
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circumstances.126 This Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”127 Our judicial system has further defined “person” as
including “[a]liens, even aliens whose presence in this country is un-
lawful.”128 Both provisions—Due Process and Equal Protection—are
universal in their application, “without regard to any differences of
race, of color, or of nationality.”129 While the Fourteenth Amendment
should guarantee these rights, the Government’s current system of
partial enforcement fails to equally protect lawful permanent re-
sidents, depending on their geographic location.
A. Equal-Protection Analysis Under Rational Basis
Equal protection litigation has a rooted history in states implement-
ing laws to limit their immigrants’ ability to participate in the econ-
omy.130 Traditionally, states were subject to a rational-basis analysis
when classifying categories in “the area of economics and social wel-
fare,”131 thus retaining broad discretion for their actions.132 Such
broad discretion meant that they only had to show that a rational rela-
tionship existed “between the disparity of treatment and some legiti-
mate governmental purpose.”133
Congress’s ability to create such categories without “actually articu-
lat[ing] at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classifica-
tion” provides flexibility for these classifications.134 Thus, courts must
uphold such classifications against equal protection challenges if
“there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.”135 If a court finds the govern-
ment’s reasoning to be inadequate, it may use post-hoc rationalization
126. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
128. Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
129. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
130. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948) (recounting that
during WWII, an amendment to the California Fish and Game Code was adopted
prohibiting issuance of a license to any “alien Japanese”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 66 (1941) (challenging a Pennsylvania law that required every adult immi-
grant to register annually and provide certain information and money).
131. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
132. Pyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (explaining that a “legislature must have substantial lati-
tude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem
perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that
account for limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill”).
133. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993); see, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn,
505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
134. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 15.
135. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
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by substituting its own “state of facts” that would satisfy the rational
basis for the classification.136
This does not mean, however, that rational-basis review for equal
protection analyses is “a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fair-
ness, or logic of legislative choices.”137 Nor does this approach permit
courts to judge Congress’s wisdom or the desirability of its policy de-
terminations concerning areas that “neither affect fundamental rights
nor proceed along suspect lines.”138 Therefore, a governmental classi-
fication fails rational-basis review only when it “rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.”139
B. Equal-Protection Analysis Under Strict Scrutiny
Recognizing that certain classifications require greater protection,
the Supreme Court has established that classifications based on alien-
age, similar to nationality140 or race,141 are “inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny.”142 Thus, state legislation applying
exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class “is confined within narrow
limits.”143 To survive strict scrutiny, the classification “must be nar-
rowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest,” with
no less restrictive means of furthering that interest.144
The Court defines “narrowly tailored” as requiring “a sufficient
nexus between the stated government interest and the classification
created by the [regulation or its implementation].”145 A law is not nar-
rowly tailored when it fails to ensure its implications minimize any
burden on those subject to its classification.146 Further, the narrow-
tailoring analysis does not vary “simply because the objective appears
acceptable.”147 Its purpose is to ensure “that the means chosen fit
th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that
136. Id. at 315 (holding that the Court may conclude that a rational basis exists for
the legislative distinction on the basis of “speculation unsupported by evidence or
empirical data,” and the fact that the Court had no evidence that the legislature actu-
ally considered the Court’s speculations is irrelevant).
137. Id. at 313.
138. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.
139. Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (quoting McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)).
140. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644–46 (1948); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
141. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191–92 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
142. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
143. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948).
144. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Nunez by Nunez v. City of San
Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997).
145. Nunez, 114 F.3d at 945.
146. Id. at 948.
147. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (holding that al-
though promoting female achievement in education is a legitimate state purpose, its
policy of excluding men from the all-women nursing institution was unconstitutional).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-3\TWL301.txt unknown Seq: 20  6-MAY-19 13:19
690 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or
stereotype.”148
For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court invalidated a Wis-
consin statute that prevented residents with delinquent child-support
payments from marrying without first obtaining a court order.149 Wis-
consin’s asserted compelling interests were that the law provided an
opportunity to counsel delinquent residents on the necessity of fulfil-
ling their prior support obligations, and it protected the welfare of
out-of-custody children.150 But the Court held that the law was not
narrowly tailored to these interests because it merely prevented delin-
quent residents from getting married, without providing any money
for their prior children.151 Further, there were less restrictive means
available that did not outright prohibit marriage.152
Unlike under rational basis, courts are unable to provide their own
reasoning to support classifications when analyzing heightened-scru-
tiny claims.153 Thus, when a court conducts a strict-scrutiny analysis, it
may only rely on the explanation and reasoning that the governmental
actor explicitly provides in its argument. For example, in United States
v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that Virginia’s policy of categori-
cally excluding women from the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”)
violated the Equal Protection Clause.154 The Court rendered this deci-
sion even after Virginia attempted to remedy the situation by creating
a sister institution, the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership
(“VWIL”), which Virginia argued provided an equal alternative to its
VMI.155
The Court analyzed this case under intermediate scrutiny, which re-
quired the State to “show ‘at least that the [challenged] classification
serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.’”156 The Court explicitly noted that the State’s justi-
fication “must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in
148. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
149. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978).
150. Id. at 388.
151. Id. at 389.
152. Id. at 389–90 (recognizing alternative solutions under Wisconsin’s current
laws, like wage assignments, civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties).
153. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (“[S]trict scrutiny is designed to
provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the
reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that par-
ticular context.”); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
154. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 556.
155. Id. at 526.
156. Id. at 533 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
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response to litigation.”157 The Court concluded that VWIL was in fact
inferior to VMI and “unequal in tangible and intangible facilities.”158
Although the Equal Protection Clause was originally intended to
limit state legislation that discriminates against certain classifications,
the Court eventually extended its coverage to include discriminatory
actions by the federal government itself.159 For example, in Bolling v.
Sharpe, the Court held that the District of Columbia acted unconstitu-
tionally by denying African Americans admissions to public school
solely because of their race.160 Although the District of Columbia was
not technically a “state” that the Constitution explicitly prohibited
from maintaining racially segregated public schools, the Court held “it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a
lesser duty on the Federal Government.”161
The Supreme Court has also recognized equal protection violations
when discrimination is based upon some group characteristic such as
geographic location.162 For example, in Gray v. Sanders, the Court in-
validated a Georgia law that gave more weight to votes from rural
voters in state elections.163 The Court analogized the different treat-
ment based on geographic location to different treatment based on
race. It determined it would clearly be unconstitutional to give greater
weight to votes based on the voter’s race.164
Therefore, Martin’s greatest chance at succeeding is for courts to
analyze his claim under strict scrutiny by arguing that the federal gov-
ernment’s lack of enforcement has created a classification based on
alienage. If successful, he must then persuade the judiciary that the
federal laws are not narrowly tailored and/or that there are less re-
strictive means available to achieve the government’s compelling
interest.
C. Courts Addressing Noncitizens’ Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The Supreme Court has struggled to balance its growing precedent
regarding equal protection challenges with the INA. Two pertinent
questions the Court has faced are: (1) What is the definition of “per-
son within its jurisdiction” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, and
157. Id.
158. Id. at 547–49 (“VWIL affords women no opportunity to experience the rigor-
ous military training for which VMI is famed. . . . VWIL students do not experience
the ‘barracks’ life crucial to the VMI experience.”).
159. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“[T]he concepts of equal protec-
tion and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not
mutually exclusive.”).
160. Id. at 500.
161. Id.
162. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 92 (1973) (White, J.,
dissenting); see also Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 4 (1971); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 565–66 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
163. Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
164. Id. at 379.
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(2) Should state and federal regulations receive the same level of
scrutiny?165
In 1886, the Court first recognized that “person” included not only
American citizens, but also “aliens and subjects of [other coun-
tries].”166 Further, in Graham v. Richardson, the Court explicitly held
that “person” applies to lawful permanent residents.167 Thus, in the
last century, the Court has analyzed equal protection claims for citi-
zens and aliens alike.
Legislative history dating back to 1886 has provided the Court its
definition of “within its jurisdiction.”168 The congressional debate of
the time focused on the importance of one’s actual location, rather
than the means by which the person got there.169 Accordingly, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection extends to anyone—citizen or
stranger—“who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into
every corner of a State’s territory.”170
Since 1941, the Court has demonstrated a higher level of deference
towards Congress’s acts on immigration171 for two reasons: First, im-
migration regulations are “so intimately blended and intertwined with
the responsibilities of the national government” that when both act on
the same subject, the federal action is supreme, and the state must
yield.172 Second, when Congress, in exercising such superior authority,
has enacted a comprehensive scheme of regulation, “states cannot, in-
consistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with,
curtail or complement, the federal law.”173 Accordingly, state laws
concerning immigration can be invalidated by either preemption or an
equal protection analysis employing strict scrutiny.
For example, in Graham v. Richardson, the Court invalidated a
state law that conditioned welfare benefits on citizenship.174 But Con-
gress had broadly declared its federal policy that lawful permanent
165. See Sessions Memo, supra note 24.
166. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (holding that
Congress statutorily extended constitutional protections “to aliens as well as to citi-
zens”); see also Yick Woo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886) (invalidating Califor-
nia law under the Equal Protection Clause because it prohibited certain Chinese
subjects from working their accustomed occupation, while allowing similarly situated
other Chinese subjects).
167. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971).
168. Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214–15 (1982) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1033, 1090 (1866)) (posing the following question in support of the resolu-
tion: “Is it not essential to the unity of the Government and the unity of the people
that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have equal pro-
tection in every State in this Union in the rights of life and liberty and property?”).
169. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (outlining the broad objec-
tives of the Fourteenth Amendment to cover all people, regardless of citizenship).
170. Pyler, 457 U.S. at 215.
171. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378–80 (1971).
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residents are not subject to deportation if they become public charges
for causes arising after their entry.175 Further, the statute imposed
auxiliary burdens upon the residence of aliens who, after entry, suf-
fered economic dependency on public assistance.176 Thus, the Court
reasoned that Congress’s policy preempted the state law.177
Strict scrutiny has proven difficult for states to overcome, even
when armed with substantial interests.178 For example, in In re Grif-
fith, the Court invalidated a Connecticut law that explicitly restricted
bar admission to citizens of the United States.179 Although the Court
acknowledged that the State had a substantial interest in the qualifica-
tions of those admitted to the bar, Connecticut’s reasoning did not
persuade it to uphold the law because it was not narrowly tailored and
there were many less restrictive means to achieve the State’s inter-
est.180 Thus, the Court ruled in favor of noncitizens.181
By contrast, federal laws concerning immigration are reviewed
under rational basis.182 For example, in Matthews v. Diaz, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a Social Security Act provision that
denied eligibility to aliens unless they were permanent residents and
met a five-year-residence requirement.183 The Court upheld the fed-
eral law, stating that it is “unquestionably reasonable for Congress to
make an alien’s eligibility depend on both the character and the dura-
tion of his residence.”184 This decision differs from Graham because
here, the federal government was properly acting to regulate naturali-
zation and immigration by regulating the conditions of entry and resi-
dence of aliens, whereas in Graham, a state contradicted existing
federal law.185
Furthermore, the Court has extended equal protection of the law to
everyone in the U.S., regardless of citizenship or legality.186 But some
175. Id. at 378.
176. Id. at 378–79 (comparing the similarity of the state statute here with the one in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); both discouraged entry into or continued
residency in the state).
177. Id. at 380.
178. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 725 (1973).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 724–28. Connecticut defended its law by arguing noncitizens would
struggle with their national loyalty, would not foster public confidence, and that some
would be unsuited to the practice of law. Id. at 724. But the Court disagreed, holding
that Connecticut can, and does, require competency training, two oaths promising to
perform the job faithfully and honestly, and supporting the constitutions of both Con-
necticut and the U.S. Id. at 725–26.
181. Id. at 728.
182. See, e.g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80–83 (1976) (recognizing that Con-
gress regularly makes rules over naturalization and immigration that would be unac-
ceptable if applied to citizens, and just because “Congress has provided some welfare
benefits for citizens does not require it to provide like benefits for all aliens”).
183. Id. at 82.
184. Id. at 83.
185. Id.
186. Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214–15 (1982).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-3\TWL301.txt unknown Seq: 24  6-MAY-19 13:19
694 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
laws—specifically federal—have traditionally been entitled to more
deference under judicial review because of Congress’s broad authority
over immigration.187 Accordingly, courts review state laws that classify
nationality under strict scrutiny and federal laws creating similar clas-
sifications under rational basis.
Now this Comment has reached its critical issue. Which potential
analysis will provide Martin the greatest opportunity to remain in the
U.S.? If a court reviewed the CSA and INA in conjunction, Martin
would probably only be afforded rational basis—the least likely ave-
nue for success. But Martin could argue that the States’ legal-mari-
juana laws violate his constitutional right to equal protection—thus
affording him strict scrutiny. Lastly, Martin could abandon his equal
protection claim and focus solely on preemption.
V. PROBLEMS FROM LACK OF UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT
Since states began contravening the CSA by establishing their own
marijuana regimes—either for medical use, recreational use, or
both—the federal government has hesitated to fulfill its enforcement
role.188 Whether this hesitation results from a lack of resources, lead-
ership, or fear of public backlash,189 one result is clear: Noncitizens
are suffering disparate treatment based solely on their geographic lo-
cation. Families in similar conditions as Martin and Hector are exper-
iencing heartbreak and dismay when one brother is thrown out of the
country (potentially forever) while the other suffers no
repercussions.190
A. Potential Outcome if Litigated Under Strict Scrutiny
If Martin’s deportation was litigated, the first step would be to de-
termine the applicable level of scrutiny. An injured noncitizen with
187. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941).
188. Cole Memo, supra note 44; Sessions Memo, supra note 24.
189. Paul Waldman, Why Jeff Sessions’ Marijuana Crackdown Is Going to Make
Legalization More Likely, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.sltrib.com/
opinion/commentary/2018/01/06/paul-waldman-why-jeff-sessions-marijuana-crack-
down-is-going-to-make-legalization-more-likely/ [https://perma.cc/6WF6-ZYBJ] (“In
states with legal marijuana systems, such a crackdown [would] produce an outcry
from both Democrats and Republicans. . . . Federal prosecutors ‘lack the resources to
go into California and enforce the marijuana laws against everybody.’”).
190. Pilkington, supra note 125 (illustrating how the Trump Administration’s immi-
gration approach has increased removals for noncitizens who have not committed
serious crimes. For example, federal officials questioned Angel Ortiz at his home
about a coworker, before realizing Ortiz illegally entered the country in 2000. Ortiz
was subsequently hauled away as his two young children watched from the window.
The article also explains how José Gutiérrez Castañeda arrived at a courthouse to pay
for minor traffic infractions but wound up in removal proceedings once the court
discovered his illegal status. Castañeda has a one-year-old daughter who came to the
country “as a child and was granted temporary legal status as a ‘Dreamer’ by
Obama,” who now must wait at least five years and pay thousands of dollars in legal
fees before she could possibly see her father in the U.S. again).
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standing191 would insist that the more stringent strict-scrutiny basis
should apply because the issue involves classifications based on alien-
age, which are “inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scru-
tiny.”192 Accordingly, the noncitizen could argue the federal
government violated his or her constitutional right to equal protection
by refusing to uniformly enforce the INA deportability statute (in re-
lation to the CSA) and instead allowing states to create laws which
expressly contradict the CSA.193
To survive strict scrutiny, the federal government must prove the
classification created by the INA and CSA is narrowly tailored to pro-
mote a compelling governmental interest.194 Here, the federal govern-
ment’s compelling interests likely involve protecting the safety and
welfare of the nation and its citizens and encouraging law-abiding
noncitizens to seek entrance into the U.S.195 Both of these justifica-
tions are likely to satisfy a court’s definition of a compelling govern-
mental interest.196
But proving the government’s classification is narrowly tailored will
be more difficult. The federal government will likely argue that it
treats illegal immigrants the same throughout the country because it
expects all of them to abide by their respective local and state laws,
whatever those laws might be.197 Further, the government can argue
that the INA’s deportability provision regarding marijuana contains a
personal-use exception,198 which prevents ICE from initiating removal
proceedings against any noncitizen found in possession of illegal mari-
juana until they have previously been convicted of a similar offense.
But this argument will likely fail under strict scrutiny because the
federal government’s inconsistent enforcement does not promote its
compelling state interests, and there are less restrictive means availa-
ble. First, lawful permanent residents like Martin can argue that the
191. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009) (“[R]espondents can
demonstrate standing only if application of the regulations by the Government will
affect them. . . .”). Here, noncitizens affected by the federal government’s lack of
uniform marijuana enforcement, like Martin because he is in removal proceedings,
have standing because the Government’s action or inaction directly affects them.
192. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (recognizing
laws that operate to “the disadvantage of some suspect class” require strict judicial
scrutiny); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
193. State Marijuana Laws in 2018 Map, supra note 32.
194. Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 1997).
195. Memorandum from Kelly to McAleenan, supra note 86; Email Interview with
Robert Mikos, Professor, Vanderbilt Law Sch. (Sept. 22, 2017) (on file with Texas
A&M Law Review).
196. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1990) (“[P]romoting the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens . . . provided a sufficiently ‘substantial’ gov-
ernmental interest. . . .”); Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982) (“[A] State might
have an interest in mitigating the potentially harsh economic effects of sudden shifts
in population [due to illegal immigration].”).
197. Email Interview with Robert Mikos, supra note 195.
198. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
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federal government’s enforcement of minor marijuana-possession of-
fenses does not protect the safety and welfare of the nation because
half of the states have enacted laws allowing the drug in some form.199
Instead of providing security to the nation, immigration officials are
weeding out peaceful noncitizens, whose “crime” is one that almost
20% of the country’s states have democratically legalized.200
Second, there are less restrictive means available to achieve the
government’s interests, namely, amending the INA’s deportability
statute as it relates to marijuana by only allowing removal proceedings
for serious drug offenses like possession with intent to distribute. This
is an offense that all states with legal-marijuana regimes have re-
tained,201 so there would never be a situation where a noncitizen could
be charged in a state following the federal government’s ban, like
Texas, but not be charged in a legal-regime state, like Colorado.
Therefore, Martin is likely to succeed in his Fourteenth Amend-
ment claim if the court applies strict scrutiny because the federal gov-
ernment will be unable to meet its heavy burden. But as mentioned
above, this result largely depends on whether the court would analyze
the issue as pertaining to a racial classification—where strict scrutiny
would apply—rather than under Congress’s inherent authority over
immigration matters.
B. Potential Outcome if Litigated Under Rational Basis
The federal government could avoid the strict-scrutiny analysis by
arguing its law should be reviewed under rational basis—the most def-
erential standard possible.202 This argument stems from the federal
government’s plenary authority regarding immigration.203 Thus, the
federal government need only show that its system bears “some ra-
tional relationship to legitimate” federal purposes.204
For example, the federal government could argue that noncitizens
who violate the law are dangerous or unworthy of remaining in the
199. State Marijuana Laws in 2018 Map, supra note 32.
200. Id.
201. See Marijuana Legalization: Florida Law, U. W. FLA., https://uwf.edu/enroll
ment-and-student-affairs/departments/wellness-services/marijuana-dope-facts/marijua
na-legalization/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6PZQ-FHR3] (showing
how Florida has legalized medical marijuana, but still criminalizes citizens who sell it).
202. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993) (stating that
under rational basis, “a classification in a statute . . . comes to us bearing a strong
presumption of validity. . . . [A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-
finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empiri-
cal data.”).
203. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941) (“When the national government by treaty or statute has estab-
lished rules and regulations touching the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of
aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the supreme law of the land. No state can add to
or take from the force and effect of such treaty or statute.”).
204. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
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country.205 Thus, Congress’s purpose when drafting immigration laws
was to ensure only law-abiding individuals may remain in the country.
Further, the federal government could argue that it is irrelevant
whether the drug laws vary from state to state because when it creates
immigration legislation, it expects immigrants to abide by local
laws.206 Or to put it differently, the federal government can claim it is
treating all noncitizens the same because it expects all noncitizens to
respect local laws, whatever those laws might be.207
But Martin could counter this argument by illustrating how the
INA’s deportability provisions specifically relate to whether the state
offense also constitutes a federal violation.208 Thus, instead of the fed-
eral government creating a minimum floor for what constitutes a
crime throughout the country, it has instead created a ceiling while
allowing many states to create less-stringent laws or even abandon
them altogether. Martin can therefore argue that the federal govern-
ment’s lack of uniform enforcement is not rationally related to this
state interest because it classifies people in one part of the country as
“law-abiding,” while classifying those in another part as “criminals,”
when they have both committed the same act that the federal govern-
ment has deemed illegal.
Lastly, the federal government could argue that lawful permanent
residents can choose to reside elsewhere, such as one of the legal-re-
gime states. But this argument would likely strengthen Martin’s case
because such a “solution” would continue violating noncitizens’ Four-
teenth Amendment rights, and the federal government could be con-
sidered to have conceded it does not equally protect its citizens.
Furthermore, the court would likely hold that this “solution” does not
bear any rational relationship to the legitimate federal purpose of en-
suring only law-abiding aliens remain in the country because “law-
abiding” here would solely be determined by one’s geographic loca-
tion in relation to that state’s marijuana laws.
Unfortunately for Martin, if the court is dissatisfied with the federal
government’s reasoning, it can substitute its own under this more leni-
ent standard.209 Because of the court’s deference to democratically
passed legislation, it affords the challenged Act “a strong presumption
205. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003) (listing statistics that showed
“[c]riminal aliens were the fastest growing segment of the federal prison population[,]
. . . and they formed a rapidly rising share of state prison populations as well. . . .
[D]eportable criminal aliens who remained in the United States often committed
more crimes before being removed.”).
206. Email Interview with Robert Mikos, supra note 195.
207. Id.
208. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190
(2013).
209. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–20 (1993) (Dissatisfied with
the party’s reasoning, the Court conceived of two rational reasons for the distinctions
embodied in the Cable Communications Policy Act).
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of validity.”210 But this does not mean all is lost for noncitizens. Al-
though courts afford much deference to the federal government’s de-
cisions under this standard,211 nongovernmental entities have
overcome this burden.212
For example, in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the
Court struck an amendment to the Food Stamp Act that rendered in-
eligible any household containing an individual unrelated to any other
member of the household.213 The Court first examined the express
purposes of the Act, which included “establishing and maintaining ad-
equate national levels of nutrition. . . .”214 After concluding that the
statutory classification (households with related persons versus those
containing one or more unrelated persons) was “clearly irrelevant to
the stated purposes of the Act,”215 the Court turned to its legislative
history, which they also found to be dissatisfactory.216
Finally, the Court considered the Government’s ad hoc argument
that the amendment was aimed at preventing fraud.217 But the Act
already contained various provisions addressing this issue.218 Thus, the
Court struck the amendment under rational basis because instead of
maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition, it excluded from
participation only “those persons who are so desperately in need of
aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so
as to retain their eligibility.”219
In Zobel v. Williams, another case where rational basis was not met,
the Court invalidated Alaska’s 1980 constitutional amendment be-
cause it violated the Equal Protection Clause.220 The amendment pro-
portionally distributed state funds to Alaskan citizens based on each
year of residency subsequent to the state’s inception in 1959.221 Ap-
plying rational basis, the Court determined Alaska’s state interest was
to create a financial incentive for citizens to establish and maintain
residence in the state.222 But the Court concluded that this amend-
ment was not rationally related to the distinct classifications based on
state duration because this interest was “not in any way served by
210. Id. at 314–25.
211. See id. at 314–16.
212. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973).
213. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538.
214. Id. at 533.
215. Id. at 534.
216. Id. (finding the only legislative history available indicated that the amendment
was “intended to prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participat-
ing in the food stamp program.”).
217. Id. at 535.
218. Id. at 536–37.
219. Id. at 538.
220. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982).
221. Id. at 57.
222. Id. at 61.
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granting greater dividends to persons for their residency during the
[twenty-one] years prior to the enactment.”223
The Court, concerned about the potential consequences of uphold-
ing the amendment, questioned what would preclude states from vary-
ing university tuition or restricting “access to finite public facilities,
eligibility for student loans, for civil service jobs, or for government
contracts by length of domicile[.]”224 Accordingly, the Court held that
Alaska failed to show that the amendment’s residency-duration classi-
fication rationally served any state interest.225
Therefore, regardless of how courts decide to analyze this equal
protection claim, there are a variety of arguments that lawful perma-
nent residents have at their disposal to fight for change and equal
treatment. If analyzed under strict scrutiny, the government should
fail because there are less restrictive means to accomplish its express
purpose of preventing serious drug smuggling,226 for example, by ex-
empting simple possession of marijuana from the INA’s list of deport-
able offenses in conjunction with the CSA. If analyzed under rational
basis, the government should still fail because only punishing lawful
permanent residents in one part of the country, while condoning con-
duct of others in specific states, is not rationally related to its interest
in promoting law-abiding immigration.
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
If a court finds that the INA, in conjunction with the CSA, fails a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge, then the federal
government must change the law to prevent lawful permanent re-
sidents from suffering further deprivations. As this Comment demon-
strates, the federal government’s unwillingness to uniformly enforce
its laws has violated lawful permanent residents’ Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to equal protection, solely based on their geographic
location.
Therefore, changes must be made in order to eliminate this dispa-
rate result. This Comment sets forth three potential solutions.227 First,
the federal government could uniformly enforce its laws throughout
the country. Second, the federal government could pass legislation re-
moving the current ban on marijuana. Third, Congress could amend
the INA by exempting any marijuana offense from requiring a report
223. Id. at 62.
224. Id. at 64.
225. Id. at 65.
226. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 80, at 1.
227. Others have addressed similar proposals in the context of other constitutional
rights, such as the Sixth Amendment. See Jordan Cunnings, Nonserious Marijuana
Offenses and Noncitizens: Uncounseled Pleas and Disproportionate Consequences, 62
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 510 (2015). These proposals lend support to the argument that they
should also be considered in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment here.
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to ICE. Alternatively, Congress could solve this problem through an
INA amendment which would require all states—even those with le-
gal-marijuana regimes—to report marijuana offenses to ICE.
A. Federal Government Uniformly Enforces the CSA
The simplest and most pragmatic solution to the geographic dis-
crimination facing noncitizens would be for the federal government to
enforce the CSA uniformly throughout the nation. Thus, lawful per-
manent residents like Martin would have no equal protection argu-
ment because Hector would also have been arrested and been subject
to deportation proceedings for the exact same offense, even though
they were on opposite ends of the country. But just because this may
be the simplest answer does not mean it is the best solution, mainly
because the federal government will have a difficult time implement-
ing it. For example, Congress may not compel or coerce states to en-
force federal law.228 But Congress can prevent states from creating
laws contrary to its own under the concept of preemption.229
Congress could threaten legislation designed to preempt all state
marijuana laws unless the states agreed to promulgate laws banning
marijuana categorically like Congress does.230 While this may facially
appear to be coercive and unfair, the Supreme Court has upheld such
conditional-preemption legislation providing states equally dire op-
tions.231 This method may be preferable because it provides states the
image of autonomy, rather than Congress simply drafting a law forbid-
ding states from legislating in the field of marijuana.
If Congress were to formally preempt this field, then courts would
assumedly strike down any contrary state law relating to marijuana
228. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that while Con-
gress has substantial constitutional power to encourage states to do certain things,
Congress “may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program”).
229. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 18 (1824) (defining the Supremacy Clause as
follows: “[I]f the mere exercise of a power by Congress takes away all right from the
State to act under that power, then any State law, under such a power, would be void;
not as conflicting with the supreme law of Congress, but as being repugnant to the
provisions of the constitution itself, and as being passed by the State, in the first in-
stance, without authority.”).
230. Mikos, supra note 24, at 1460.
231. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982)
(“There is nothing in PURPA ‘directly compelling’ the States to enact a legislative
program. In short, because the two challenged Titles simply condition continued state
involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consideration of federal proposals, they do
not threaten the States’ ‘separate and independent existence.’”); Oklahoma v. U.S.
Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) (upholding Congress’s power to attach
conditions to grants-in-aid received by the States, although the condition under attack
involved an activity that “the United States is not concerned with, and has no power
to regulate”).
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under the Supremacy Clause.232 Although this would not address the
federal government’s lack of enforcement, it would halt states that
currently follow the federal ban on marijuana from considering its le-
galization. Further, it would send a strong message to all citizens that
the federal government is finally addressing the issue. However, due
to the country’s current state of division over issues like Deferred Ac-
tion for Childhood Arrivals233 and drug policy,234 this may not be
Congress’s most favorable approach.
The federal government could also pursue scare tactics by prosecut-
ing a large investor for the marijuana industry. Under the Sessions
Memo, the Department of Justice can begin prosecutions against can-
nabis business owners and operators “who are completely in compli-
ance with State law,” thereby dealing a crippling blow to capital
formation and innovation.235 Once the Attorney General initiates le-
gal proceedings against a reputable investor like Arcview,236 then the
flow of investing money will likely come to a halt due to fear of legal
and reputational repercussions.237 It may be wise for the federal gov-
ernment to pursue a couple of small investors as well to make the
marijuana industry aware that no one is safe from its reach.238
232. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 18. This has happened in the immigration realm before.
See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
233. Andrew Desiderio, Democrats Divided Over Forcing a DACA-Shutdown
Even After Trump’s ‘Sh*thole’ Saga, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 16, 2018, 11:07 PM), https://
www.thedailybeast.com/democrats-divided-over-forcing-a-daca-shutdown-even-after-
trumps-shthole-saga [https://perma.cc/9AM4-WMFR] (demonstrating that Progres-
sive Democrats are seeking to excite their base with a “my way or the highway” strat-
egy on DACA; meanwhile Republicans are divided over whether to support stopgap
measures).
234. Maia Szalavitz, Women Are Leading the Fight Against the War on Drugs, VICE
(Feb. 5, 2018, 1:10 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/8xd9pv/women-are-lead
ing-the-fight-against-the-war-on-drugs [https://perma.cc/7WPS-UNQY]. Although the
article cites statistics showing the majority of the U.S.’s adult population (including
“the same Republican Party that remains behind Trump”) supports legalizing mari-
juana, it notes that “a return to all-out drug war seems implausible” after President
Trump’s State of the Union speech where he “doubled down once again on the drug
war, calling for policies that ‘get much tougher on dealers and pushers.’”).
235. Alan Brochstein, Cannabis Stock Investors Should Pay Attention to the U.S.
Federal Policy Change, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2018, 9:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
alanjbrochstein/2018/01/21/cannabis-stock-investors-should-pay-attention-to-the-u-s-
federal-policy-change/#49eb04d37889 [https://perma.cc/7XRU-N5GN].
236. Paul Sullivan, As States Legalize Marijuana, Investors See an Opportunity,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/your-money/mari
juana-investments.html [https://perma.cc/HP7C-3927]. Since 2011, Arcview, consisting
of 600 investors, “has made $155 million worth of investments in the cannabis indus-
try, from growers and dispensaries to companies that make ancillary products, like
vaping devices.” Id. Almost $50 million of their investments came from 2017 alone.
Id.
237. Brochstein, supra note 235 (Sessions’s memo has left “cannabis operators and
their regulators subject to being prosecuted for breaking federal law and has created a
very uncertain operating environment.”).
238. Email Interview with Robert Mikos, supra note 195.
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Investors are not the only potential target; the federal government
could also prosecute banks under federal money-laundering laws239 to
stifle the marijuana industry.240 A crackdown on banks would hurt the
already “all-cash businesses,” making it even harder for marijuana
companies to pay taxes.241 Recent state efforts to address this problem
include Colorado chartering its own credit union dedicated entirely to
marijuana companies.242 But the federal banking system and the
courts rejected this approach because it would “facilitate criminal ac-
tivity.”243 Although this strategy would not initially solve Martin’s
problem of unequal protection, it could potentially lead states to fol-
low the federal government’s marijuana ban. This would cause lawful
permanent residents like Martin’s brother, Hector, to be criminally
charged, regardless of their geographic location.
However, not every possible scenario to uniformly enforce the CSA
involves strong-arming the states through litigation. A common con-
gressional tactic involves offering states grants in exchange for them
passing certain legislation.244 For example, Congress could avoid pre-
emption altogether by offering states grants for improving their high-
ways245 or adopting national standards,246 in exchange for state
legislation that eliminates exemptions and mirrors Congress’s categor-
ical criminal bans on marijuana.247 This falls short of compelling state
action because the grants could theoretically be refused.248 Courts
have also held that if a congressional action passes muster under the
Commerce Clause, then it cannot be considered coercion under the
239. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2012).
240. See Jeremy Berke, This Could Be the No. 1 Problem Facing Legal Weed Busi-
nesses in America, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 20, 2016, 11:59 AM), http://www.businessin
sider.com/no-1-problem-facing-legal-weed-businesses-2016-4 [https://perma.cc/6VJG-
KV8X]; Katherine Pickle, Will State-Based Changes To Marijuana Laws Soon Impact
Entire Country?, YELLOW HAMMER, http://yellowhammernews.com/politics-2/will-
state-based-changes-marijuana-laws-soon-impact-entire-country/ (last visited Jan. 4,
2019) [https://perma.cc/8C47-C9FR] (noting that banks “may be penalized for money
laundering or tied into the illegal transport of the drug over state lines. Attorneys are
hesitant to work for marijuana corporations, as attorneys remain bound by federal
law.”).
241. Berke, supra note 240; Pickle, supra note 240 (“[M]arijuana corporations can-
not write-off expenses like rent or utilities when filing their federal taxes.”).
242. Pickle, supra note 240.
243. Id.
244. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 766 (1982).
245. Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (holding that a statute
conditioning receipt of highway funds on a state’s adoption of a minimum drinking
age is a “valid use of the spending power”).
246. Cf. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that Congress’s
establishment of a national speed limit did not violate the Tenth Amendment).
247. Mikos, supra note 24, at 1460.
248. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171–73 (1992) (distinguishing condi-
tional spending from commandeering); Skinner, 884 F.2d at 449 (“Withholding funds
is simply a lesser form of coercion than enacting a flat Congressional mandate with
which a state is obligated to comply.”).
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Spending clause.249 This strengthens the federal government’s power
to preempt states with legal-marijuana regimes because the Supreme
Court has already held that the Commerce Clause provided constitu-
tional authority to Congress to ban marijuana under the CSA.250
Although the federal government appears to have the legal author-
ity to reign in states with legal-marijuana regimes and has made some
steps in this direction,251 many Americans still doubt it will enact seri-
ous intrusions because of rising public support for legalization252 and
lack of federal resources.253 Any attempt to require legal states to en-
force the federal marijuana prohibition by using their own resources
will be futile under coercion.254 Thus, the federal government would
have to supply its own DEA agents to administer its laws, but the lack
of resources and manpower within the DEA is why the Obama Ad-
ministration issued its lenient Cole Memo in the first place.255
While some of these tactics will not immediately affect lawful per-
manent residents like Martin, their end-result—enforcing a uniform
ban on marijuana—will result in Martin and Hector receiving equal
treatment, regardless of their geographic location.
B. Federal Government Removes Ban on Marijuana
The antithesis to the first-proposed solution involves the federal
government acquiescing to state and public pressure to remove its ban
on marijuana. Congress could easily achieve this by removing mari-
juana from the CSA.256 If Congress takes this step, then it must decide
the next crucial issue: whether it should impose national regulations or
allow states the freedom to establish their own requirements for li-
249. Skinner, 884 F.2d at 449–50.
250. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
251. See Sessions Memo, supra note 24.
252. Victoria Balara, Fox News Poll: Support for Legalizing Marijuana Hits Record
High, FOX NEWS (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/fox-news-poll-sup
port-for-legalizing-marijuana-hits-record-high [https://perma.cc/6JT8-CVCC] (show-
ing a 33% increase in favoring legalization since 2001); Sean Williams, This New Mari-
juana Survey Tells You Everything You Need to Know About Public Sentiment,
MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 10, 2018, 11:41 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/02/10/
this-new-marijuana-survey-tells-you-everything-you.aspx [https://perma.cc/R544-
MNHQ] (Fox News poll from January 2018 found that “59% of the 1,002 respondents
favored legalizing weed.” Gallup’s poll from October 2017 found that “64% of re-
spondents favored legalization.” This was an increase from only 25% in 1995.).
253. Phillip Smith, 3 Reasons Why Trump Might Hesitate to Go After Legal Pot,
ALTERNET (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.alternet.org/drugs/3-reasons-trump-unlikely-
go-after-legal-marijuana [https://perma.cc/Y3QA-UXP3] (“The DEA doesn’t have an
army big enough to effectively [enforce federal marijuana laws]. . . . Marijuana legali-
zation is popular, more popular than Trump.”).
254. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
255. Cole Memo, supra note 44 (recognizing the federal government’s limited re-
sources, this memo encouraged prosecutors to focus on serious drug crimes, rather
than simple possession crimes).
256. Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?, 65 CASE WEST-
ERN RES. L. REV. 689, 709 (2015).
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censing and business-regulation purposes. Unbeknownst to many, in
2013 Congressman Jared Poll introduced a comprehensive proposal
comprised of such considerations with his Ending Federal Marijuana
Prohibition Act.257 Under this Act, marijuana would be exempt from
the CSA, and enforcement authority over the drug would transfer
from the DEA to a newly renamed Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Ma-
rijuana, Firearms, and Explosives.258
Many opponents of the current federal ban on marijuana advocate
rescheduling the drug to a lower level.259 But this solution does noth-
ing to help those in Martin’s position around the country, and it would
not address the federal government’s inconsistent enforcement strat-
egy. Regardless of its schedule, if marijuana remains listed under the
CSA (even if under the most lenient Schedule V classification), then
the INA’s corresponding sections still subject such marijuana-posses-
sion offenses to deportation.260 Thus, only a complete declassification
of marijuana from the CSA would prevent the application of the
INA’s deportability section.261
Another possibility involves the federal government allowing the
states discretion in how they wish to regulate marijuana. This can be
achieved in one of two ways. First, Congress could pass legislation al-
lowing states to either follow the current federal ban, or submit their
own regulatory legislation, subject to approval by the Secretary of
Health. This mirrors dispute in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Man-
agement.262 There, Congress adopted OSHA, which created safe and
healthful working conditions.263 Instead of entirely preempting states
from creating their own safety conditions, Congress added a section
providing states the opportunity to submit their own plans to the Sec-
retary of Health for approval.264 This strategy would benefit the fed-
eral government because it would ultimately retain the final say on
marijuana regulation.
257. H.R. 499, 113th Cong. § 101 (2013).
258. Id.
259. Harrison Jacobs, The DEA Treats Heroin and Marijuana As Equally Danger-
ous Drugs, BUS. INSIDER (May 22, 2016, 5:54 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-
drug-scheduling-system-heroin-marijuana-2016-5 [https://perma.cc/9E2C-922N]
(“Over the years, the DEA has repeatedly resisted attempts to reschedule or
deschedule marijuana, despite the appeals of advocacy groups and the DEA’s own
members.” Such groups include the American Medical Association, the National
Academy of Medicine, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the National Organ-
ization for Marijuana Laws.).
260. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2012) (defining a controlled substance as a drug included
in schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the chapter). The controlled substance inadmissibil-
ity and deportability grounds both refer to this definition. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
261. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6).
262. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt., 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
263. Id. at 96.
264. Id. at 97.
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Second, Congress could repeal any mention of marijuana from the
CSA, thus removing its prohibition, and allow states to choose
whether to legalize it or not. This solution would benefit Martin be-
cause even if Texas were to remain a prohibition state, Martin’s pos-
session conviction would no longer be a federal offense. Thus, ICE
and the INA would not be involved in Martin’s subsequent state crim-
inal proceedings, making Martin’s deportation highly unlikely, if not
impossible.
C. Federal Government Amends the INA
Although lowering marijuana’s scheduling under the CSA would
not affect the INA’s applicability for deportation, amending the INA
could provide an adequate remedy for Martin.265 Congress could pro-
pose legislation to amend the INA that would exempt any marijuana-
possession offense from being reported to and acted upon by ICE.
This would not be the first time Congress has amended the INA.266 If
passed, then it would not matter if lawful permanent residents reside
in legal-marijuana states. For example, even if Martin received two
marijuana-possession convictions in an illegal state, like Texas, there
would be no fear of potential deportation because ICE would not be
notified.267 And even if state officers who opposed this lenient ap-
proach notified ICE anyways, ICE would have no legal authority to
punish Martin under such legislation.
Alternatively, Congress could amend the INA to require legalized
states to report if a noncitizen is found to be in possession of mari-
juana. Although the federal government cannot compel state officials
and law enforcement to do its regulatory work for them,268 the gov-
ernment could attempt to obtain state acquiescence by conditioning
state grants.269 For example, courts would likely uphold a federal law
conditioning funds for improving a state’s infrastructure on its compli-
ance with this INA reporting amendment.270
But this is the least likely solution for the government to pursue
because it fails to adequately address this Comment’s concerns for
lawful permanent residents like Martin. Additionally, states that cur-
rently have legal-marijuana regimes are unlikely to abandon them for
federal funds when they have been making over a billion dollars each
265. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6); see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
266. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (In the early 2000s, Congress amended the INA by
adding the personal-use exception.).
267. Id. The INA requires a conviction for violating a state or federal law relating
to controlled substances before a noncitizen is subject to deportation. Id.
268. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
269. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987).
270. See id.
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year from the marijuana industry.271 Instead of relying on the federal
government for its infrastructural needs, states could use their profits
from marijuana taxation. Ultimately, states with legal-marijuana re-
gimes would likely not follow this reporting requirement, thereby
foregoing the federal funds to maintain their current system and con-
tinue appeasing its constituents,272 the majority of whom voted for le-
galization in their state referendum.273 This would result in the same
problem that is currently imposed upon lawful permanent residents:
unequal treatment based solely on their geographic location. Thus,
amending the INA is unlikely to effect the change needed to address
the government’s Fourteenth Amendment violation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The consequences facing lawful permanent residents because of the
INA’s deportability provision, in relation to the CSA’s listing of mari-
juana, are severe and unconstitutional. Noncitizens are subject to
prison-like detentions, and families have been torn apart for “crimes”
that a majority of states have decriminalized and a fifth of which have
even fully legalized, contrary to federal law. Most importantly, the
federal government’s failure to uniformly enforce its marijuana ban
has caused lawful permanent residents in one part of the country to be
treated unequally from those in another, solely because of their geo-
graphic location. This problem will only grow larger as other states
adopt more lenient approaches towards marijuana. This Comment
suggests several ways for the government to correct this wrong, but
ultimately the key to finding a solution that addresses the concerns of
noncitizens involves conducting a national dialogue where every voice
has the opportunity to be heard.
271. James Nash, A $1 Billion Marijuana Windfall for New Jersey? Some Say it’s
Possible, NORTH JERSEY (Jan. 2, 2018, 5:18 PM), https://www.northjersey.com/story/
news/new-jersey/2018/01/02/1-billion-marijuana-windfall-new-jersey-some-say-its-pos
sible/990192001/ [https://perma.cc/TG74-TKUU]; Alicia Wallace, Colorado’s 2017
Marijuana Sales Reach $1 Billion in Just Eight Months, CANNABIST (Oct. 11, 2017,
5:54 PM), https://www.thecannabist.co/2017/10/11/colorado-marijuana-sales-august-
2017-tax-data/89751/ [https://perma.cc/8CYK-8PMX].
272. Pickle, supra note 240 (“[M]any argue that legalization should be for state
citizens to decide.”).
273. See History of Marijuana on the Ballot, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
History_of_marijuana_on_the_ballot (last visited Feb. 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
ZJM6-TJ8W]. Of the 30 states that have passed medical marijuana legalization, half
were through statewide ballot measures. Id. “Nine marijuana-related measures ap-
peared on statewide ballots in 2016. All but one was approved.” Id.
